Abstract
Introduction
The basic idea of secret sharing schemes M is a method to share a secret K among a group of participants. Suppose there exists a secret K and a group of participants P = {P 1 , P 2 , …, P n }, and some of them in A ( A ⊆ P ) are qualified to know the secret, then by pooling together their partial information, they can reconstruct the secret.
(⊆ 2 P ) is called an access structure which is a family of all subsets of participants who are able to reconstruct the secret. For any subsets A ∈ Γ are called authorized sets, and the subsets which don't belong to are called unauthorized set. Let D (∉ P) denotes a dealer who selects a secret and distribute a share to each participant, and makes sure they can not get any information of the secret unless all of them in an authorized set get together.
Because our final goal is to put this scheme in practice on computer science, we can think that the subkey S i (also called share) that P i holds is a series of bytes. If they want to reconstruct the secret K, each of them has to provide their series of bytes S i and through some computation then they can reconstruct this secret K.
Let secret K is chosen from K with the uniform distribution. Let p K be a probability distribution on K. Let p S(A) be a probability distribution on the shares S(A) given to a subset A ⊆ P. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if
Where H(K) and H(K|A) denote the entropy of p K and the conditional entropy by the joint probability distribution p K×S(A) , respectively.
Let S(P i ) denotes the set of possible shares that P i might receive.
denotes the information rate for P i . In general, the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by the information rate ρ [11] defined as ρ = min{ρ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We use ρ(M) to denote the information rate of a secret sharing scheme M. A secret sharing scheme M is called
After Blakley [1] and Shamir [10] independently introduced the concept of secret sharing problem in 1979, this problem was studied by numerous authors. Some of them are interesting in (k, n)-threshold scheme [10] , that means the access structure Γ equals to the set of every h ≥ k participants. On the other hand, secret sharing schemes realizing more general access structures than that of a threshold scheme were also studied by lots of authors [9, 12, 13] .
In [3, 4] , Chaudhry, Ghodosi and Jennifer promoted a scheme based on Room Square. A Room square R of order r is an r × r array, each of whose cells may either be empty or contain an unordered pair of objects 0, 1, 2, …, r, subject to the following conditions: 1. each of the objects 0, 1, 2, …, r occurs precisely once in each row and column of R. 2. every possible unordered pair of objects occurs precisely once in the whole array.
, (x, y)denotes the position of the pair (k, l) in the Room square. If any Q i is removed, the room square is no longer uniquely completed. Hence, Q provides minimal information which R can be reconstructing uniquely. The following figure is an example for Room square of order 7 and one of its critical sets Q = {(2, 7; 4, 6), (3, 4; 1, 2), (4, 2; 3, 7), (5, 2; 1, 4), (5, 3; 2, 7), (6, 4; 3, 5) , (6, 6 ; 0, 6), (7, 5; 3, 4) , (7, 6; 2, 5), (7, 7 ; 0, 7)}. Chaudhry, Ghodosi and Jennifer set a Room square be the secret, then we can let the shared secret be K = Q since a critical set Q can uniquely reconstruct R.
That means the cost can be reduced since the bites that be shared is less than the really secret. In [4] , they give a scheme for sharing the secret from Room square, the scheme is simple but the information rate is not satisfactory. For example, it will be 1/ ( )
for the access structure of a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Actually, if we combine four elements in all quadruples Q i of a critical set Q to form a secret K and use the secret sharing scheme for general access structure proposed by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [9] or Tochikubo [12] , it can increase the information rate but the computation will be more complicated.
In this paper, we give two new schemes for the access structure of a (n-1, n)-threshold scheme. That is more simple than Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme and the information rate is 1/2, although it is not like Shamir's scheme is ideal, but it is far from the rate of the original scheme.
The improvement
The main ideal of our scheme is using linear equations to reduce the length of subkey that every participant holds. First, we give n equations E: There are 2n + 1 variables in E. But if we have known y i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and S, then we can get the unique values x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So we have the following scheme.
A new (n -1, n)-threshold scheme
In the following scheme, we combine four elements in all quadruples Q i of a critical set Q to form a secret K (In the following subsection, we will propose a modified scheme which will use the original secret Q separately). Let p is the smallest prime that larger than the biggest possible K, and let Z p be a finite field with p elements. The following calculate are all computing on Z p , that is, any computation over this set has to modulo p. And we may assume K = Z p .
Distribution:
Step1: choose n random numbers a i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n from Step 3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, distribute (x i , y i ) = (S i , a i ) to participant P i .
Reconstruction:
Step 1: let the n -1 of n participants get together and pool their subkeys (
Step 2: K = S -a j-1 is the reconstruction secret, where if j = 1, then set j -1 = n.
An example for the new scheme
Suppose P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 }, K is the secret, use the distribution method of 2.1, we choose a, b, c, d be four random number first, and get
) / 3 And for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, distribute S i to participant P i , and also give a, b, c, d to P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , respectively. Actually, the four values S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 satisfy the following four equations:
So, when we receive any three subkeys from the four participants, it is easy to obtain the secret K.
Property of the new scheme
The next theorem shows that the proposed new scheme is perfect. Theorem 1: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , …, P n } and the access structure Γ = {A | A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ n -1 }, distribute shares for a secret K by using the proposed new scheme mentioned in subsection 2.1. Then, for any subset
. Proof: First, we prove (a). Without loss of generality, suppose X = {P 2 , P 3 , …, P n }, then And since P n has the random number a n , Hence we can obtain K and H(K|X) = 0.
Next we prove (b), we only need to show H(K|X) = H(K) when |X| = n -2. Without loss of generality, suppose X = {P 1 , P 2 , …, P n-2 }, then we have (S i , a i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n -2. Then by the definition of x i , and since there are n -3 equations are equivalent, we will get the following four equations: a n -1 + (n -2)a n + S = C 1 a n -1 + a n + S = C 2 x n -1 -a n -1 -a n -S = C 3 x n -(n -2)a n -1 -a n -S = C 4 where C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 are constants number. In the four equations, there are five unknowns. Simplify these equations, then we can get the exact value of x n -1 and a n and produce two equations as follow: a n -1 + S = C 5 x n -(n -2)a n -1 -S = C 6 where C 5 , C 6 are constants numbers. Since a n -1 is a random number from Z p = K, where K is chosen from.
Hence, H(K|X) = H(K).

A modified scheme for 2.1
We use the original secret Q separately instead of combine all four elements in c quadruples Q i of a critical set Q to form a secret K in this subsection. That is, the secret is (x i , y i ; k i , l i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c. Then the information rate will be increase to 4c/(4c + 1), but it is no more perfect since H(K|X) ≤ H(K) for X ∉ Γ. In this modified scheme, let p is the smallest prime that equal to or greater than r (the size of Room square). And the following calculations are all computing on Z p .
Distribution:
Step1: choose n random numbers a i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. And
Step 2: for 1 ≤ i ≤ c, set
Step 4: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, distribute (S(i, j), a i ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ c to participant P i .
Reconstruction:
Step 2: for 1 ≤ i ≤ c, Q j = S i - (a q-1 , a q-1 , a q-1 , a q-1 ) is the reconstruction secret, where if q = 1, then set q -1 = n.
Conclusion
From this paper, we promote two methods to improve secret sharing schemes from room square on (n-1, n)-threshold scheme. As following table, we compare our scheme ("N." for the New scheme proposed in 2.1; "M." for the modified scheme proposed in 2.4) with the origin scheme (Chaudhry and Seberry [4] ) ("CS") and Shamir's scheme ("S.") in four ways: perfect or not ("p"), the information rate ("ρ"), and the number of add, times or divide used in the scheme for distribution ("+/.# of D.") and reconstruction ("+/.# of R."), where c is the number of quadruples in the critical set. From table1, it is easy to see that our scheme is reduced a large number of computations than Shamir's scheme, and does not add too much than the original scheme, but the information rate are increased to a efficient scheme. Actually, for the modified scheme (2.4), we can give 4cn random numbers according to every variable. Then it will get the performance as same as the new one (2.1). Furthermore, if we change the number of random numbers, then the performance will accompany change, too. And we can choose any one of them according to the practical demand.
The improvements above are efforts so far, but there are some remaining issues which need to be explored further. First, by now, we only created the model for (n-1, n)-threshold scheme. But in practical phenomena, how can we make any k of n participants to reconstruct the secret? Moreover, how about non (k, n)-threshold? Second, in the modified scheme discussing in section 2.4, although we improved the information rate closing to ideal one, but it became an unperfect scheme, which is not safe for secret distribution, how can we remove this weakness? Third, discussing so far, we are merely focusing the linear equation solution, which is not related to the special characteristic of room squares (i.e. quadruples), we hope the schemes we proposed here can be extended to the general access structure, and use the characteristic of the Room square deeper.
